


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Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation (Routledge Studies in Corporate Governance)

Virginia Bodolica, Martin Spraggon
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Virginia Bodolica, Martin Spraggon : Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation (Routledge Studies in Corporate Governance) before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation (Routledge Studies in Corporate Governance):

Over the past decades, the total value of executive compensation packages has been rising dramatically, contributing to a wider pay gap between the chief executive officer and the average worker. In the midst of the financial turmoil that brought about a massive wave of corporate failures, the lavish executive compensation package has come under an intense spotlight. Public pressure has mounted to revise the levels and the structure of executive pay in a way that will tie more closely the executive wealth to that of shareholders. Merger and acquisition (MA) activities represent an opportune setting for gauging whether shareholder value creation or managerial opportunism guides executive compensation. MAs constitute major examples of high-profile events prompted by managers who typically conceive them as a means for achieving higher levels of pay, even though they are frequently associated with disappointing returns to acquiring shareholders. *Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation* reviews the existing empirical evidence and provides an integrative framework for the growing body of literature that is situated at the intersection of two highly debated topics: MA activities and executive compensation. The proposed framework structures the literature along two dimensions, such as MA phases and firm's role in a MA deal, allowing readers to identify three main streams of research and five different conceptualizations of causal relationships between MA transactions and executive compensation. The book makes a comprehensive review of empirical studies conducted to date, aiming to shed more light on the current and emerging knowledge in this field of investigation, discuss the inconsistencies encountered within each stream of research, and suggest promising directions for further exploration. This book will appeal to researchers and students alike in the fields of organizational behavior and governance as well as accounting and accountability.

About the Author Virginia Bodolica is Associate Professor of Management at American University of Sharjah, School of Business and Management, UAE. Martin Spraggon is Associate Professor of Management at American University of Sharjah, School of Business and Management, UAE.